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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Ten  years  ago,  neuroscientists  began  to study  cultural  phenomena  by using  functional  MRI.  Since  then
the  number  of  publications  in this  ﬁeld,  termed  cultural  neuroscience  (CN),  has  tremendously  increased.
In these  studies,  particular  concepts  of culture  are  implied,  but rarely  explicitly  discussed.  We  argue  that
it is  necessary  to make  these  concepts  a topic  of  debate  in  order  to  unravel  the  foundations  of  CN.  Fromeywords:
ultural neuroscience
niversalism
ifferentialism
40  fMRI  studies  we extracted  two  strands  of reasoning:  models  investigating  universal  mechanisms  for
the formation  of  cultural  groups  and  habits  and,  models  assessing  differences  in characteristics  among
cultural  groups.  Both  strands  simplify  culture  as  an inﬂexible  set  of  traits  and  speciﬁcities.  We  question
this rigid  understanding  of culture and  highlight  its  hidden  evaluative  nature.
© 2011  Elsevier  Ltd.  Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ooping effect
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. Introduction
“There are two distinct strands of thought within the twentieth-
century history of biological determinism. The ﬁrst [...] is the
argument that assumes socially relevant differences between
individuals and groups [...]. The second claims to account for,
not differences but assumed universals in human nature [...]”
Steven Rose (2001b)
In the humanities, “culture”2 has been a topic of discussion
ince the 18th century (Busche, 2000). By contrast, the natural
ciences – speciﬁcally the cognitive neurosciences – have picked
p on this topic only in the last decades (Chiao, 2009; Han and
orthoff, 2008; Kitayama and Park, 2010; Losin et al., 2010; Vogeley
nd Roepstorff, 2009). In the year 2000, functional magnetic res-
nance imaging (fMRI) studies were published for the ﬁrst time
n order to investigate this issue (Hart et al., 2000; Phelps et al.,
000). Today, this ﬁeld of research is called cultural neuroscience
CN), and the number of publications and research grants related
o it has increased tremendously. One deﬁnition sees CN as “a the-
retical and empirical approach to investigate and characterize the
echanisms by which [the] hypothesized bidirectional, mutual consti-
ution of culture, brain, and genes occurs”  (Chiao and Ambady, 2007).
ccording to this deﬁnition CN, takes the diversity of “cultures” as
 starting point. In contrast, other examples from the ﬁeld of CN
nvestigate the universal mechanisms of the interaction between
cultural groups”, e.g. Adams et al., 2010; Chiao et al., 2008; Derntl
t al., 2009a; Rule et al., 2009. Both approaches are based on com-
arisons between divided groups and communities, e.g. Easterners
s. Westerners, Asian vs. Caucasian, Americans vs. Turks, Blacks
s. Whites. Few researchers have highlighted critical aspects of
N. Among them, however, Choudhury and Kirmayer point to
arallels to patterns in colonial psychiatry, criticize the “biologiz-
ng of social facts”, and elaborate the social consequences of this
biologized” difference in terms of “discrimination and disadvan-
age” (Choudhury and Kirmayer, 2009). Additionally, Vogeley and
oepstorff (2009) discuss not primarily content-related, but rather
 as well as Losin et al. (2010) – methodological ﬂaws of CN. Instead
f adding further remarks in the present summary of CN articles,
e aim at providing a foundation for a general critical review.
hereby, our main focus is not on methodological issues but on
evealing implicit concepts of culture, ethnicity, or race. Our anal-
sis intends to provide the theorization of such empirical research
nd to unravel heretofore unexamined assumptions. We develop a
ategorial system for expounding on the problems of reasoning in
he ﬁeld of CN. Two main lines of such reasoning are differentiated:
rstly, investigation and elaboration of universal mechanisms for
he formation of “cultural groups and habits” (called universalism),
nd secondly, the differentiation of characteristics among “cultural
roups” (called differentialism). Furthermore, the type of compar-
son (within-participants vs. between-participants comparisons),
he implicit valuation of these comparisons, the subject of the com-
arisons, and the applied concepts of culture were extracted and
re discussed in the following section.
. Anthropological approaches
“Culture”, although intensively investigated, remains one of the
ost difﬁcult concepts to deﬁne in current times. There are two
ain subdisciplines in the history of anthropological approaches
o explain the nature of culture: biological/evolutionary and
2 The terms “culture” or “race” are written using quotation marks to clarify that
e  adapted them from the quoted studies, but would not make ourselves the same
sage of them.obehavioral Reviews 36 (2012) 152–161 153
social/cultural anthropology. Biological anthropology investigates
the link between culture and biology and between culture and race
in part. It regards culture as part of the evolutionary process of
humankind and focuses on (1) the question of whether or not “cul-
ture” is unique for human beings and on (2) the evolution of the
human species, which is tightly linked to the former. In contrast
to biological anthropology (and the evolution of culture), the def-
initions of culture which have been introduced by social/cultural
anthropologists are based on Edward B. Tylor’s inﬂuential formula-
tion: “Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is
that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law,
custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man  as a
member of society”  (Tylor, 1873). This pluralistic concept of culture
clearly withdraws from categories such as race. However, these
approaches introduce the category of ethnic groups into this ﬁeld
of research. Thus, differences in behaviors between social groups
are explained without reference to (pseudo)biological causes but
instead to social ones. Culture is deﬁned as a “more or less consistent
pattern of thought and action”  (Benedict, 1934). Moreover, culture is
a hot topic in contemporary debates in anthropology. Adam Kuper,
for example, makes the ﬁeld of anthropology itself a topic of debate.
In his book, Culture. The Anthropologists’ Account, he evaluates the
usefulness of the term “culture” as an analytical concept and, refer-
ring to anthropology in the 1990s, states that “the current politicized
discourse on culture provokes uneasy reﬂections on the implications
of anthropological theory”  (Kuper, 1999). Regarding contemporary
American anthropology, he summarizes that common sense in this
ﬁeld tells us to reject ideas that dictate that “differences are natural,
and that cultural identity must be grounded in a primordial, biolog-
ical identity”; at the same time, however, arguing with “a rhetoric
that places great emphasis on difference and identity”. Together with
Walter Benn Michaels he expounds on the problems of modern
cultural concepts, which are not a “critique of racism”  but “a form of
racism” because cultural identity “recourse[s] to the racial identity”
(Michaels, 1995). Kuper, however, criticizes the “alternative to this
slide into essentialism [. . .] to make identity into a cultural construct”
as well. Because “this is to make culture (or discourse) into the only
power in the land, and one that is apparently without any independent
justiﬁcation” (Kuper, 1999).
Another contemporary approach in anthropology is brought
forth by Lock and Nguyen, who  aim at linking anthropology to
biomedicine (Lock and Nguyen, 2010). By doing so, they question
the standardized view on medicine and reconsider differences by
introducing the term of “local biologies”. According to this view,
human biology is subject to “evolutionary, historical, and contempo-
rary social change”. The distinction between cultural and biological
approaches is thereby aimed to be overcome.
3. Concepts of culture
As mentioned in the introduction, the nature and idea of culture
has been subject to debates in the humanities for the past three
centuries (Busche, 2000), ﬁrst with Immanuel Kant and Johann
Gottfried Herder, and then later with Wilhelm von Humboldt,
Adolf Bastian, Matthew Arnold and ﬁnally Franz Boas. Today, var-
ious research disciplines treat the topic of culture and refer to
these discourses about culture. Since there is no general consen-
sus about the deﬁnition of culture, the way culture is sometimes
treated even contradicts within disciplines. In 1952, Kroeber and
Kluckhohn identiﬁed more than 150 different concepts of cul-
ture, and it is obvious that that number has even increased since
then. Furthermore, the ambiguous application of the term culture
in everyday language is an indication of an increasing drain of
meaning. For this reason and in order to approach culture from a
scientiﬁc perspective, it is inevitably necessary to precisely deﬁne
1 nd Biobehavioral Reviews 36 (2012) 152–161
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Table 1
Classiﬁcation of fMRI approaches to “culture”.
Universalism and culture
•  assumptions about universal mechanisms of ingroup-outgroup formation,
customs, or habits
• “culture” as a methodological means for the demarcation of group-identity
•  mechanisms are investigated based on the interaction between “cultural
groups”
(i)  Resemblance
© phenotypical similarities between participants and/or stimuli
©  group membership is deﬁned on the basis of putatively biological and
directly observable characteristics, such as skin color
(ii) Stereotype
© differences in group-favoritism as a consequence of social learning
© “race”/“culture” as a result of social construction processes
(iii)  Familiarity
© differences in behavior toward other “races”/“cultures” due to lack of
exposure to people, habits, or customs of another group
Differentialism and culture
• “culture” is itself the subject of analysis
• “cultural” knowledge or practices implicate variation of behavior and distinct
neural activation patterns
(i) Biological explanatory models
©  neurofunctional differences between “cultures” are explained by
inherently manifested physiological characteristics
(ii) Culturally acquired knowledge
© “cultural” speciﬁcities are related to processes of socialization and
learning54 M. Martínez Mateo et al. / Neuroscience a
he underlying concept. A comprehensive review of the history and
ypology of the different concepts of culture is given by Andreas
eckwitz (2000).  Reckwitz distinguishes four axes: the norma-
ive, the totality-oriented, the differentiation-theoretical and the
eaning- and knowledge-oriented concept of culture. The ﬁrst two
oncepts refer to the developments of the English and German
omanticism in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The nor-
ative concept values culture as an attainable High Culture, which
anifests in aesthetic categories that are inherited via art, morality,
cience, religion or law. In this concept, culture is considered as such
n singular. Totality-oriented concepts refrain from aesthetic valu-
tions and propose an equality of cultures. The totality-oriented
oncept regards collectives as thought, practice, and perception
nits. Such cultures are conﬁned to themselves as discrete entities
nd can be compared accordingly to other cultures. This and the fol-
owing two models conceptualize an impression of culture in plural.
he differentiation-theoretical concept identiﬁes cultures as sub-
ystems within one system and is used in several systems theories.
n addition to other social subsystems, such as health systems or
olitical systems, culture refers here to a speciﬁc sector of society.
n the last decades, the meaning- and knowledge-oriented concept
f culture was the term most applied in humanities. It refers to
 humankind-generated complex of thoughts, perceptions, values
nd meanings, which are materialized in symbolic systems. Com-
on to all approaches that apply this latter concept is that culture
s not conﬁned to particular sub-domains but instead incorporates
ultiple and diffuse networks or rhizomes (Deleuze and Guattari,
977), respectively.
Three well-known protagonists in humanities elaborate on such
 deﬁnition of culture. First, Reckwitz conceptualizes culture not as
 common way of living, ideas or texts but according to a “theory of
ractice” as knowledge-oriented social practices (Reckwitz, 2005).
econd, Adam Kuper recommends avoiding “the hyper-referential
ord [culture] altogether, and to talk more precisely of knowledge, or
elief, or art, or technology, or traditions, or even of ideology (though
imilar problems are raised by the multivalent concept)” (Kuper,
999). Finally, Michael Fischer proposes the concept of culture as
n “experimental tool” which makes “visible the differences of inter-
st, access, power, needs, desires, and philosophical perspective(s)”
Fischer, 2007).
. Guidelines for classiﬁcation
For the classiﬁcation of fMRI approaches to “culture” we
xtracted the concepts and assumptions used in the explanations
f the studies. These were ﬁled into two main categories that were
egarded as most proximate to the studies’ argumentation pat-
erns and will therefore allow critical evaluation of the processes
n CN.
These categories correspond to the two main anthropological
pproaches to culture identiﬁed above: ﬁrst, approaches based on
 common human biology, and, secondly, approaches focussing on
he plurality of cultural practices. To refer to these categories we
reely adapted the classiﬁcation introduced by Steven Rose in his
ook Alas, Poor Darwin to describe the two strands which life sci-
nces apply to approach humankind (Rose, 2001b): universalism
nd differentialism. With these concepts, Rose tries to describe
wo different ways of determining human practices and behav-
or. However, we believe that there is a direct link from such a
inarity to the description of “cultural phenomena” in CN. For the
resent qualitative analysis, we adapt these two strands of reason-
ng to the ﬁeld of CN elaborating several subcategories to describe
he various explanations offered for “cultural phenomena” (see
able 1; Supplementary Material I for in-depth clariﬁcation of the
lassiﬁcation).•  different understanding of subjectivity
• different everyday regional/national practices and speciﬁcities
•  different language or script systems
5. Literature review
5.1. Selection of studies
We searched peer-reviewed journals [indexed in large
databases (MEDLINE, Google Scholar, PsycInfo, PubMed; until 04-
12-2010)] for English language manuscripts of original functional
magnetic resonance imaging studies which addressed psychologi-
cal processes with cultural content. These studies are summarized
in Tables 2 and 3. Due to the novelty of the research ﬁeld of CN,
the literature research was not conﬁned to a speciﬁc time period.
All manuscripts included in the current analysis met the follow-
ing inclusion criteria: (1) measurement of blood oxygenation level
dependent (BOLD) effects using fMRI technology [search words:
fMRI, functional MRI, magnetic resonance imaging, BOLD, brain-
/neuroimaging; exclusion of studies investigating structural MRI,
morphometry/VBM, EEG, or DTI/white matter]; (2) no restriction
regarding the data analysis method or scanning parameters; (3)
psychological processes, such as emotion, cognition, language, self,
memory, motor aspects, etc., as the focus of the study; (4) human
research subjects (rather than, e.g. primates); (5) culturally associ-
ated aspects addressed, either within the participants’ description
or within the fMRI paradigm [search words: culture, ethnicity,
demographic group, race, independence/interdependence, East-
ern/Western, allocentric/egocentric, black/white]; (6) presented
data fulﬁlled the criteria of original articles, conveying the discov-
ery of new knowledge rather than emphasizing the development
of methods or the review of an area of research. Our goal was to
provide a full picture of the nascent ﬁeld of CN and to qualita-
tively analyse its unexamined assumptions. Some of the included
articles were identiﬁed after careful screening of citations in the ini-
tially collected articles. We  subsumed studies under the umbrella
term cultural neuroscience which did not label themselves as CN,
but instead used terms such as race, ethnicity, population, demo-
graphic groups, nationality, etc. All of these terms have overlapping
but at the same time distinct deﬁnitions. For example, Chiao deﬁnes
culture according to Markus and Kitayama (1991) as “a social
group whose members share one or more of the following: a common
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Table  2
Universalism and culture.
Universalism and culture
N Author/year Journal WP BP Concept fMRI task Level of comparison
Resemblance
Phenotypic
A Adams et al. (2010) J Cogn Neurosci × × TO reading the mind in the eyes White American–native Japanese
A  Chiao et al. (2008) J Cogn Neurosci × × TO facial expression recognition native Japanese–Caucasian in US
A  Derntl et al. (2009b) BMC  Neurosci × TO emotion recognition in faces African American–Caucasian
Austrian
A Derntl et al. (2009a) Soc Neurosci × TO emotion recognition in faces Asian–Caucasian Austrian
A  Golby et al. (2001) Nat Neurosci × Race face perception African American–European
American
A  Hart et al. (2000) Neuroreport × × TO face processing White–Black
A  Krill and Platek (2009) Front Evol Neurosci × Race social exclusion racial IG–OG, i.e. ingroup-outgrouop
A  Lieberman et al. (2005) Nat Neurosci × × TO race processing in faces African American–Caucasian
A  Phelps et al. (2003) Neuropsychologia × Race face processing and IAT, i.e. implicit
association test
White–Black
A  Richeson et al. (2003) Nat Neurosci × Race Stroop task White–Black
A  Richeson et al. (2008) Group Process Intergroup Relat × Race face processing and eye-gaze
direction
White–Black
A  Rilling et al. (2008) Neuroimage × TO prisoners dilemma White–Black–Asian
A  Ronquillo et al. (2007) Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci × Race social categorization task, i.e. age
evaluation
Afrocentric–Eurocentric
A  Rule et al. (2009) Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci × × TO voting behavior Japanese–American
A Van  Bavel et al. (2008) Psychol Sci × Race processing of IG and OG IG–OG
A  Xu et al. (2009) J Neurosci × × TO pain empathy while viewing faces Caucasian–Chinese
Constructed
A Kobayashi et al. (2007) Brain Res × MKO  false belief task English
monolinguals–Japanese/English
bilinguals
B  Rilling et al. (2008) Neuroimage × TO prisoners dilemma White–Black–Asian
B  Rule et al. (2009) Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci × × TO voting behavior Japanese–American
B Van  Bavel et al. (2008) Psychol Sci × Race processing of IG and OG IG–OG
Stereotypes
B  Chiao et al. (2008) J Cogn Neurosci × × TO facial expression recognition native Japanese–Caucasian in US
A  Cunningham et al. (2004) Psychol Sci × Race face processing
[automatic/controlled]
White–Black
B  Derntl et al. (2009b) BMC  Neuroscience × TO emotion recognition African American–Caucasian
Austrian
B Hart et al. (2000) Neuroreport × × TO face processing White–Black
A  Knutson et al. (2007) Hum Brain Mapp × Race IAT with race and gender Black–White names
B  Lieberman et al. (2005) Nat Neurosci × × TO race processing in faces African American–Caucasian
A  Phelps et al. (2000) J Cogn Neurosci × TO face processing White–Black
B  Richeson et al. (2003) Nat Neurosci × Race Stroop task White–Black
C Rilling et al. (2008) Neuroimage × TO prisoners dilemma White–Black–Asian
B  Ronquillo et al. (2007) Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci × Race social categorization task, i.e. age
evaluation
Afrocentric–Eurocentric
C  Van Bavel et al. (2008) Psychol Sci × Race processing of IG and OG IG–OG
A  Wheeler and Fiske (2005) Psychol Sci × Race categorization of faces vs.
individuation
White–Black; European
American–Asian American
Familiarity
B  Adams et al. (2010) J Cogn Neurosci × × TO reading the mind in the eyes White American–native Japanese
C  Chiao et al. (2008) J Cogn Neurosci × × TO facial expression recognition native Japanese–Caucasian in US
B  Cunningham et al. (2004) Psychol Sci × Race face processing
[automatic/controlled]
White–Black
A  Demorest et al. (2010) Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci × × TO/MKO music memory Turks–Westerners–Chinese, WP
Turks–USA, BP
C  Derntl et al. (2009b) BMC  Neuroscience × TO emotion recognition in faces African American–Caucasian
Austrian
B Derntl et al. (2009a) Soc Neurosci × TO emotion recognition in faces Asian–Caucasian Austrian
A  Goh et al. (2007) Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci × TO object/background processing Asian–Westerners
B  Golby et al. (2001) Nat Neurosci × TO face perception African American–European
American
C  Hart et al. (2000) Neuroreport × × TO face processing White–Black
B  Knutson et al. (2007) Hum Brain Mapp × Race IAT with race and gender White–Black names
A  Morrison et al. (2003) Neuroimage × × TO/MKO music comprehension trained–untrained;
Chinese–Westerners
A Nan  et al. (2008) Hum Brain Mapp × TO music processing Asian music–European music
B  Phelps et al. (2000) J Cogn Neurosci × TO face processing White–Black
B  Phelps et al. (2003) Neuropsychologia × Race face processing and IAT White–Black
B  Richeson et al. (2008) Group Process Intergroup Relat × Race face processing and eye-gaze
direction
White–Black
C Rule et al. (2009) Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci × × TO voting behavior Japanese–American
Note: N deﬁnes the number of appearances of the same publication; WP/BP denote the within-participants/between-participants comparisons; totality-oriented concepts of
culture  are abbreviated with TO; meaning- and knowledge oriented concepts of culture are abbreviated as MKO; Race signiﬁes studies which do not explicitly use a concept
of  culture itself, but instead of race or racial groups.
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Table  3
Differentialism and culture.
Differentialism and culture
N Author/year Journal WP  BP Concept fMRI task Level of comparison
Biological explanatory models
D Chiao et al. (2008) J Cogn Neurosci × × TO facial expression recognition native Japanese–Caucasian in US
A Gutchess et al. (2006) Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci × TO object processing, i.e. holistic
vs. speciﬁc
Westerners–East Asians;
Americans–Asians
A  Kobayashi et al. (2006) Brain Lang × × TO language effects on ToM bilinguals–monolinguals
A Moriguchi et al. (2005) Neuroreport × × TO facial expression recognition Caucasian–Japanese
A  Okuyemi et al. (2006) Addict Biol × × TO/MKO response to smoking
cues/reward anticipation
African
American–Caucasian–native
Americans–low status Americans
C Ronquillo et al. (2007) Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci × Race social categorization task, i.e.
age evaluation
Afrocentric–Eurocentric
A Zhang et al. (2006) Sci China C Life Sci TO Chinese self Chinese–Westerners
A  Zhu et al. (2007) Neuroimage × TO self-representation independent–interdependent;
Westerners–Easterners
Culturally acquired knowledge
Self concepts
A Chiao et al. (2009b) Hum Brain Mapp × TO self-judgement task Japanese–American
A Chiao et al. (2009a) J Cogn Neurosci × TO cultural priming Asian–Westerners
A  Han et al. (2008) Soc Neurosci × MKO  trait judgement task Christians–non religious
B Kobayashi et al. (2007) Brain Res × MKO  false belief task English
monolinguals–Japanese/English
bilinguals
A  Kobayashi et al. (2008) Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci MKO  false belief task early–late Japanese/English
bilinguals
B Moriguchi et al. (2005) Neuroreport × × TO facial expression recognition Caucasian–Japanese
D  Rule et al. (2009) Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci × × TO voting behavior Japanese–American
A Sui  and Han (2007) Psychol Sci × MKO  priming of indepen-
dence/interdependence
constructed groups of
independence/interdependence
D  Van Bavel et al. (2008) Psychol Sci × Race processing of IG and OG IG–OG
B Zhang et al. (2006) Sci China C Life Sci TO Chinese self Chinese–Westerners
B  Zhu et al. (2007) Neuroimage × TO self-representation independent–interdependent;
Westerners–Easterners
Regional/national practices and speciﬁcities
C Derntl et al. (2009a) Soc Neurosci × TO emotion recognition in faces Asian–Caucasian Austrian
B  Goh et al. (2007) Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci × TO object/background
processing
Asian–Westerners
C  Golby et al. (2001) Nat Neurosci × Race face perception African American–European
American
A  Gron et al. (2003) Eur J Neurosci × TO nonverbal episodic memory,
i.e. abstract objects
Chinese–Caucasian
B  Gutchess et al. (2006) Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci × TO object processing, i.e. holistic
vs. speciﬁc
Westerners–East Asians;
Americans–Asians
A Hedden et al. (2008) Psychol Sci × TO perception/line length
evaluation
East Asian–European
American/independence–
interdependence
C  Kobayashi et al. (2007) Brain Res × MKO  false belief task English
monolinguals–Japanese/English
bilinguals
C  Phelps et al. (2000) J Cogn Neurosci × TO face processing White–Black
A  Tang et al. (2006) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA × TO/MKO arithmetic performance English–Chinese; Eastern–Western
Language system
B  Kobayashi et al. (2006) Brain Lang × × TO language effects on ToM bilinguals–monolinguals
D  Kobayashi et al. (2007) Brain Res × MKO  false belief task English
monolinguals–Japanese/English
bilinguals
A  Siok et al. (2004) Nature × TO/MKO reading/dyslexia Caucasian–Chinese
B  Tang et al. (2006) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA × TO/MKO arithmetic performance English–Chinese; Eastern–Western
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ulture  are abbreviated with TO; meaning- and knowledge oriented concepts of cul
f  culture itself, but instead of race or racial groups.
eaning system, social practices, geographical space, social and reli-
ious values, language, ways of relating, diet, and ecology” (Chiao
t al., 2008). Contrary to culture, nationality is viewed as “a type
f social group membership that can be acquired (e.g. citizenship
y marriage) without necessarily sharing cultural experience, val-
es, practices, or beliefs”  (Chiao et al., 2008). Similar to nationality,
ace is regarded as “a type of social group membership that also
oes not necessarily involve shared cultural experience, values, prac-
ices, or beliefs”, but instead “[...] share a common ethnic heritagethin-participants/between-participants comparisons; totality-oriented concepts of
re abbreviated as MKO; Race signiﬁes studies which do not explicitly use a concept
and a subset of physical attributes (e.g. skin tone, facial, and body
shape)” (Chiao et al., 2008). Okuyemi and colleagues suggest with
Senior and Bhopal (1994) that “ethnicity is a more appropriate term
to describe social groups, instead of race which historically has con-
noted a biological distinction”  (Okuyemi et al., 2006). In spite of
these deﬁnitions, we  prefer to pool these terms for our analysis, as
we believe that such categories are discursive constructions which
are reproduced by a seemingly scientiﬁc distinction of the vari-
ous terms. A similar set of problems applies to all of such terms
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nd, in agreement with Kuper, we are convinced that “there are
undamental epistemological problems, and these cannot be solved
y tiptoeing around the notion of culture, or by reﬁning deﬁnitions”
Kuper, 1999).
.2. Organization of the results
Forty publications from August, 2000 to April, 2010 met  our
nclusion criteria. In a ﬁrst step, we extracted the type of compari-
on (e.g. ingroup vs. outgroup, white vs. black), the applied concepts
f culture (according to Reckwitz), and the psychological domain
rom each of the included manuscripts (see Tables 2 and 3). In a
econd step, we evaluated each manuscript according to our the-
retical model of universalism and differentialism (see Table 1).
e extracted passages which emphasized and validated the allo-
ation to one of the above-mentioned theoretical categories (see
upplementary Materials 2 and 3). The categorization of studies
as based on single quotations which is why some manuscripts
re listed several times in the tables (see notes in Tables 2 and 3).
inally, we discussed each theoretical category with regards to the
urrent literature on CN and provide examples of studies that met
ur theoretical criteria.
.3. Types of comparisons in CN
“Cultural” comparisons include comparisons either between-
articipants, within-participants, or even both between- and
ithin-participants. In the ﬁrst case, the sample is not divided into
everal sub-groups of “cultures”, but the task addresses different
cultures” within the stimulus material, such as “to investigate the
nﬂuence of poser ethnicity, half of the stimuli were Caucasian (CA)
aces; the other half African American (AA), and stimuli were equally
istributed across facial expressions [...]” (Derntl et al., 2009b).  In
 between-participants comparison, the stimulus material is held
onstant, but the sample consists of two or more “cultures”, e.g.
eleven Americans (5 of them male) and 11 East Asians (6 of them
ale) participated in the study” (Gutchess et al., 2006). Finally, com-
arisons within- and between-participants consist of two or more
cultural samples” and different “cultural stimulus” material, e.g.
ten AA [African Americans] and ten EA [European Americans] right-
anded males were recruited from San Francisco Bay Area colleges and
niversities. [...] Stimuli consisted of color photographs of 42 AA and
2 EA males standardized for neutral facial expression and background
llumination” (Golby et al., 2001) (see also Tables 1 and 2).
. Theoretical classiﬁcation of CN studies and discussion
In the following section we will review and discuss universality-
nd differentiality-based approaches separately. Overall, we
ssumed that each category with its respective subcategories con-
ains problematic issues which were borne out by several of the
entioned studies, and will focus our discussion on those studies.
.1. Universalism and culture
About half of the identiﬁed manuscripts either designed their
MRI paradigms according to universality-based approaches to
cultural phenomena” or at least provided explanations support-
ng this view. For example, Hart and colleagues state that their
tudy “was explicitly designed to assess fMRI responses to outgroup
s ingroup faces across subjects of both races, rather than to assess
ny differences that might exist between subjects based upon race”
Hart et al., 2000). By this expression they clarify that their inves-
igation and thus the origin of their study design focused on
imilarities, implying that the phenomenon in question, i.e. out-
roup vs ingroup face processing, has a common, universal humanobehavioral Reviews 36 (2012) 152–161 157
basis. This explanatory model is mostly based on assumptions of
evolutionary psychology in explicit opposition to the ideology of
social Darwinism, which assumes biological differences between
distinguishable groups. The universal concept of culture explains
differences between groups, not on a biological basis, but as a
result of universal foundations (Rose, 2001a). However, “racial” or
“cultural” group demarcation is postulated as a universal and bio-
logically determined human principle. It serves as predisposition
for racism or discriminative behavior, which is thereby interpreted
to be common among all human beings. In agreement with this,
evolutionary psychology, views racism in relation to natural selec-
tion affordances (Workman and Reader, 2004). On this foundation,
such explanatory models have been intensively criticized (Rose
and Rose, 2001) for biologizing racism, treating it as an unchange-
able part of human nature, and thus providing a legitimization for
it (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1990). In this way, structural imbal-
ances of power are neglected. The same critique can be raised with
respect to CN, where these evolutionary patterns of explanation
have been picked up to illustrate processes of ingroup favoritism
and own-race bias. Thus, different pre-given groups are used in the
stimulus material or for the participants’ selection (see above). The
assumption for the formation of such groups – not in the behavior
or functional activation measures, but in phenotypical features –
is that “races” (Golby et al., 2001; Richeson et al., 2003; Richeson
et al., 2008; Ronquillo et al., 2007) and “cultures” (Adams et al.,
2010; Chiao et al., 2008; Derntl et al., 2009a; Rule et al., 2009)
are unambiguously distinguishable. We  argue that by doing so the
universal claim, which the mentioned studies take as their con-
ceptual starting point, is waived. These issues are prominent in all
three of the following subcategories; the additional argumentative
peculiarities of each are discussed below.
6.1.1. Resemblance
Among these studies, universal explanations were most preva-
lently based on phenotypic similarities between participants and
respective stimulus material [e.g. comparisons between black vs.
white skin colors (Richeson et al., 2008), afrocentric vs. euro-
centric features (Ronquillo et al., 2007) or between Japanese vs.
Caucasian faces (Chiao et al., 2008)] and thus related to puta-
tively biological criteria. The problem with this approach is that the
outer appearance and, accordingly, the phenotypical deﬁnability of
group membership form the main argument of group demarcation,
ignoring underlying political and social processes. The biological
existence of “races” is thereby assumed.
Moreover, some investigations base their argumentation on
the assumption of an essential and insurmountable identiﬁcation
with people of the same outer appearance [e.g. assuming more
pain-empathy (Xu et al., 2009) or attention to faces (Golby et al.,
2001) for members of the same “race”]. As Phelps and co-workers
have reported, “[...] the amygdala response to social group infor-
mation derived from faces appears to be automatic”  (Phelps et al.,
2003), so that phenotypical features appear to be related to auto-
matic processes of group-formation. Thereafter, the identiﬁcation
with one’s group seems to be an uncontrollable characteristic
of human nature. Referring to the general critique on universal-
ism, it is questioned if such a deterministic biological foundation
for group-demarcations is still in opposition with social-darwinist
assumptions about inherent biological differences between groups.
We interpret this as evidence that there is only a short distance
between them, since both have a deterministic view on group-
identiﬁcation. Again, a legitimization of racism is implied in studies
of this category which view the mechanisms for group demarcation
as being related to automatic ingroup favoritism: “the better perfor-
mance for in-group expressions of happiness and sadness, emotions
that have a strong social aspect, could possibly be driven by stronger
empathy for in-group faces. Higher accuracy for out-group expres-
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ions of disgust and anger, two negative and complex emotions in part
ndicating avoidance, might be especially important when expressed by
ut-group posers thus eliciting more attention” (Derntl et al., 2009b).
urthermore, in various research studies such reasoning is based
n an evolutionary argumentation, e.g. that heightened bilateral
mygdala response “may  indicate heightened arousal to or vigilance
or fear expressed by members of one’s own cultural group because this
xpression serves as an indicator of impending threat (Glascher and
dolphs 2003; Davis and Walen 2001). More speciﬁcally, fear perceived
n a member of one’s own cultural group may be interpreted as more
ikely to indicate danger for one’s self compared to fear perceived in a
ember from another cultural group (Elfenbein and Ambady 2002)”
Chiao et al., 2008).
A sub-group of research studies based their interpretations of
 universality of “cultural phenomena” on constructed rather than
henotypic resemblances. For example, Rilling et al. (2008) make
se of a minimal group paradigm with random distribution of
articipants either to a ﬁctional red or a black group. Notably, this
pproach is not based on racial assumptions, but the same biologi-
al explanations for the demarcation of groups are offered. Without
xplicitly mentioning “races”, the above-mentioned critique of
egitimizing racism must likewise be applied as “it contributes to
eifying socially constructed categories that may themselves be causes
f discrimination and disadvantage” (Choudhury and Kirmayer,
009).
he “Mexican” categorization (Kerner, 2009)
Until 1930, Mexicans were categorized as “white” according
o the U.S. Census Bureau. Since then, however, Mexicans were
iven their own “racial” category. After protests of the Mexican
overnment, Mexicans were again labeled as “white” in the three
ubsequent censuses. From 1970 on, the term “race” in association
ith skin color was omitted and substituted by the “cultural” cate-
ory “Hispanics”, meaning “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican,
outh or Central American or other Spanish culture or origin regardless
f race” (Grieco and Cassidy, 2000). Thus, this example illustrates
ell how group demarcation highly depends on volatile political
ircumstances and negotiations.
.1.2. Stereotypes
Stereotype-based explanatory models focus on circumstances
f discrimination toward people because of “culture” (Chiao et al.,
008), skin color (Knutson et al., 2007; Richeson et al., 2003)
r other features, such as facial physiognomy (Ronquillo et al.,
007). Such learned stereotypes are raised as an explanation for
bserved differences in neural activation patterns confronting
ifferent “cultural groups”. Thus, in this case the processes of
emarcation of groups are linked to socially acquired knowledge
e.g. regarding “racial” attitudes (Richeson et al., 2003), semantic
ssociations (Ronquillo et al., 2007) and evaluations (Phelps et al.,
000)]. Accordingly, stereotypes about other “cultural groups” are
egarded as the cause of neural activity increases, e.g. “[...] insular
ctivation may be due partly to unpleasant feelings such as dis-
ust (Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003) experienced
hen white participants are presented with stereotypically black male
ames” (Knutson et al., 2007). Although such explanatory pat-
erns provide the opportunity to consider the contingency of group
valuation, in the reviewed studies this is not realized, since bio-
ogical foundations implying better evolutionary adaptation are
resented: “People instantly categorize other people on the basis of
ocial distinctions such as race, gender, and age. Such rapid and even
utomatic responses direct much of human cognition and behavior.
he sensory and social world bombards people with information, so
uch adaptive shortcuts efﬁciently use their limited mental resources”
Wheeler and Fiske, 2005). According to this quotation, havingobehavioral Reviews 36 (2012) 152–161
stereotypes about “racial groups” is not only viewed as advan-
tageous in structuring everyday-life impressions (which must be
questioned itself), but instead regarded as a necessity of human
cognition. The automatism proclaimed within this process renders
stereotypes as unavoidable and their social conditionality is thus
displaced by their assumption of universal and automatic biological
foundations.
6.1.3. Familiarity
In this subcategory the assumption that familiarity to group
speciﬁcities prestructures one’s behavior toward them is fun-
damental. Here, the demarcation of groups is related to
group-referential learning, mostly based on the time spent in a
“foreign culture” or years of customization to a “culture” as it is
described, e.g. by Golby and co-workers: “From a young age, people
usually have much more experience with faces from their own racial
group (Chance et al., 1982). Such variation in social experience may
contribute importantly to the development of visual expertise with
faces” (Golby et al., 2001). Obviously, it is assumed that differ-
ences in behavior and cortical activation patterns toward people
of another “race” are due to their apparent strangeness. Factors
such as experience (Golby et al., 2001), exposure (Chiao et al.,
2008), or perceptual expertise (Golby et al., 2001) are offered as
explanations for the psychological reaction toward the outgroup.
Thus, the idea of an original group living in a homogenous environ-
ment (assuming that, e.g. all Germans in Germany have the same
experiences) is proposed. Similarly, this implies that the objects of
experience must be more homogenous within a predeﬁned group
than between different groups. Again, such logic assumes resem-
blance among group-members, “tend[ing] to ignore variation within
the group” (Choudhury and Kirmayer, 2009).
6.2. Differentialism and culture
Studies quoted in this category focus on a “body of background
traits that are automatically imprinted and expressed in every indi-
vidual of a certain culture” (Vogeley and Roepstorff, 2009). In
differentiality-based approaches, “culture” is itself the subject of
analysis. Here, “cultural” knowledge or practices implicate a varia-
tion of behavior and, accordingly, distinct neural activation patterns
in CN. Differentiality-based argumentations have already been
applied in cultural psychology. In this regard, Oyserman and col-
leagues elaborated on methodological issues regarding the loose
handling of cultural constructs in “the overly broad and diffuse ways
researchers deﬁne and assess these constructs and their apparent
willingness to accept any cross-national difference as evidence of indi-
vidualism and collectivism processes” (Oyserman et al., 2002). A more
theoretical critique is raised by Miller who  states that “attention
must be paid to the heterogeneity of cultural meanings and practices
across contexts as well as within populations. Equally, it is important to
recognize that cultural meanings and practices shift in complex ways
over historical time” (Miller, 1997).
These issues recur in CN studies as well. However, the direct link
to up-to-date biotechnology (here fMRI examinations) strengthens
a biologized view on “culture”. Therefore, ﬁndings in this ﬁeld of
research exert a tremendous impact on the reproduction of stereo-
types and racism.
The mentioned issues are prominent in both of the following
subcategories; their respective additional argumentative peculiar-
ities are discussed below.
6.2.1. Biological explanatory models
In this category, “cultural” experiences and differences are
understood in biological terms. For example, Ronquillo and
colleagues write that “one theory of racial bias states that White
Eurocentric phenotypic characteristics (e.g. lighter skin and eye color,
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onger and straighter hair, narrower nose and thinner lips) are prefer-
ble to features toward the opposite end of the continuum (e.g.
arker skin, kinkier hair, broader nose and fuller lips; Maddox, 2004)”
Ronquillo et al., 2007). Whereas in this quotation the authors
ssign physical appearances to “racial categories”, which is picked
p on below to explain differences in functional activation mea-
ures, other authors directly link the concept of race to distinct
rain functions. Accordingly, Zhu and colleagues assume that dif-
erent neural substrates underlie the self in Western vs. Eastern
cultures” and state that their “results suggest that Western inde-
endent self is mediated by unique neural substrates, whereas East
sian (e.g. Chinese here) interdependent self depends on overlapping of
eural substrates for the self and close others”  (Zhu et al., 2007). More-
ver, Moriguchi and co-workers suggest different visual processing
attern between Caucasian and Japanese individuals in identifying
earful faces, e.g. “a template-matching process for facial recognition
ight be related to the ‘mirror neuron’ system. [. . .]  During observa-
ion of fearful faces, we propose that Japanese subjects may utilize a
emplate matching system to identify the type of emotion expressed,
hereas Caucasian subjects may more directly recognize faces as ‘fear-
ul’, thus inducing stronger emotional responses. One would argue that
he different brain activity patterns in the present study may reﬂect
acial difference of visual processing pattern rather than that of emo-
ional recognition patterns” (Moriguchi et al., 2005). In all examples,
ither referring to distinct physical attributes, which exert their
mpact on the neural correlates or directly to functional or struc-
ural brain differences, the classiﬁcation of people into different
roups is based on physiological features (including among oth-
rs facial physiognomy (Moriguchi et al., 2005)). Here, the critique
oiced by postcolonial and racism-theorists that sees a continuity
etween the colonial usage of the concept of “races” and modern
pproaches to “cultural diversity” must be applied (Taguieff, 1992).
rom this perspective, approaches to “cultural diversity”, even
hough having overcome a system of “racial” hierarchies, share
nderlying assumptions that also originate from insurmountable
ifferences (Brown, 1993). The idea of clearly deﬁnable “cultural”
emarcations cements “cultural” belonging as essential, just as
he biological concept of “race” did. This continuity becomes even
ore explicit when “cultural practices” are explained in biological
erms. This perspective obviously resembles classic racist ideolo-
ies, substituting race with culture. We  agree with Choudury’s and
irmayer’s statement that “attributing cultural difference to the brain
ade it intrinsic to the physical make-up of people, sidestepping the
eed to defend a historically contingent hierarchy of values, and ulti-
ately serving explicitly racist ideologies”  (Choudhury and Kirmayer,
009).
.2.2. Culturally acquired knowledge
Studies focusing on culturally acquired knowledge and prac-
ices most often keep the idea of “cultural totalities” as their
tarting point. These totalities are assumed to have speciﬁc char-
cteristics that distinguish them from one another (i.e. see TO
n Tables 2 and 3). Here, the accusation of essentializing cultural
dentity is similarly relevant. Especially studies that select national
orders to demarcate “cultures” seem to blur contingent political
ituations with individual identity. Another kind of argumentation
ocuses not on national demarcations but on a binary structure
etween two  main “cultural groups”. Here, the idea is that the world
s divided into two main groups, such as Eastern vs. Western (Chiao
t al., 2009a; Zhang et al., 2006), which is exempliﬁed among oth-
rs by Zhu et al. (2007): “Additional brain structures linked to self-
nd mother-judgments, in Chinese, compared with Western individ-
als, provide further neuroimaging evidence for the interdependent
elf formed by East Asian culture”. Further, independent vs. inter-
ependent (Sui and Han, 2007; Zhu et al., 2007) or individualistic
s. collectivistic “cultures” “provide direct evidence that cultural val-obehavioral Reviews 36 (2012) 152–161 159
ues of individualism and collectivism inﬂuence neural mechanisms
underlying the self” (Chiao et al., 2009a).  Importantly, in all these
explanation patterns the individual is just the anonymous repre-
sentative for a “cultural totality”, often implying a construction of a
“Western perspective” which is contrasted to the “rest” (Hall, 2008).
A Eurocentric perspective is thereby taken as a default, implying
that Europe or the West is the owner of the Enlightment’s achieve-
ment of the conscious and rational individual. This is supported
by critiques of (cross-) cultural psychology which often regards
European Americans as the gold standard for, e.g. individualism,
against which most cross-cultural comparisons are made (Bond,
2002; Oyserman et al., 2002). The cause of differences in neural acti-
vation patterns is speculated to lie in different regional or national
practices, i.e. “the best explanation for members of the two  cultures
exhibiting increased activation in opposite task conditions is that each
culture exhibits a preferred processing mode (relative for East Asians,
absolute for Americans)” (Hedden et al., 2008). Similarly, different
language systems accompanied by different processing strategies
are hypothesized to account for differences in neural activation
measures between “cultures”, e.g. “it is possible that the Japanese
ToM [Theory of Mind] task demanded orthography-related seman-
tic analyses more than the English ToM task for children” (Kobayashi
et al., 2007).
7. Looping effect
Science and knowledge always develop in a speciﬁc socio-
historical situation from which categories and research questions
are extracted (Rose, 2001a).  In his article “The looping effects of
human kinds”, Ian Hacking states that such knowledge simultane-
ously generates new categories and new research ﬁelds (Hacking,
1995). Hacking labels the backlash of biologically driven explana-
tions onto the social world as “looping effects” (Hacking, 1995).
Related to the current review of CN studies, biological-evolutionary
justiﬁcations for discriminatory behavior (universalism and cul-
ture) and the biology-driven segregation of “cultures” or the
construction of a dichotomy between the East and the West (dif-
ferentialism and culture), for example, are problematic, given the
danger of reproducing and strengthening such categories. More-
over, such discourses always run the risk of self-referential biasing
due to mutual citations. Thus, the truth of science is a construc-
tive process which arises from a self-fulﬁlling and self-reproductive
community. From this perspective, science never is neutral and
always transports a concrete view of the world. The claim of being
“descriptive rather than prescriptive” (Workman and Reader, 2004)
is not sustained. Especially the quoted CN studies demonstrate in
various respects the valuation of used categories, as “the narrower
lens for the Americans may correspond more closely to a single target
object. This type of focus would explain the special status of objects in
cognitive processing (Davenport and Potter, 2004), as well as our ﬁnd-
ing of more distinct processing of objects for Americans”  (Gutchess
et al., 2006).
8. Conclusion
Our discussion reveals that the approaches to “culture” offered
by CN are not neutral and are always tainted to some degree
by speciﬁc political attitudes. In this article we  reviewed scien-
tiﬁc research studies which investigate the neural foundations of
human “cultural phenomena” and aim at discovering how “human
culture” is manifested in neural activation patterns. Our aim was
to disclose their presumed and often unexamined implications
and to expound on their socio-cultural consequences. Thus, we
applied a categorical system, i.e. universalism and differential-
ism, and referred to critical issues within both categories. Main
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esults extracted from the quoted studies were their simplistic view
n a biological foundation for the demarcation of “cultures” (i.e.
niversalism) as well as for “cultural” differences themselves (i.e.
ifferentialism). By providing this overview, it is further revealed
hat most of the CN studies have an understanding of “culture” and
race” which still appeals to biology, blood and ancestry, indicat-
ng a transition from classical to cultural racism. Practically none of
he quoted studies provided elaborate deﬁnitions of their object of
nvestigation and, according to the typology introduced by Reck-
itz (see above), most of the CN studies apply a totality-oriented
pproach to culture (see Tables 2 and 3; Concepts). For all these rea-
ons, we suggest that the categories and results published in this
rea should be taken with caution.
In light of the present critique, similar issues stick to rising
trands in the neurosciences such as the application of seemingly
bjective classiﬁcations of “cultural groups” by means of machine-
earning algorithms (Ge et al., 2009), as well as to other research
elds which, e.g. link infectious diseases (“Can the common brain
arasite, Toxoplasma gondii, inﬂuence human culture?” (Lafferty,
006)), imaging genetics (Kumakiri et al., 1999), or hormonal reac-
ivity (De Dreu et al., 2011) to “culture”.
Finally, we would like to provide a critical reﬂection of our
wn research standpoint: we realize the inﬂuence of our scientiﬁc
nd personal background on the present analysis and its conclu-
ions. Likewise, CN is rooted in a cultural context which deﬁnes
he relevant research questions and topics. This cultural context is
raversed by social circumstances, political interests, or balance of
ower. In this sense, we see ourselves as part of speciﬁc discourses
hich form our research and which are also formed by it.
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